People v. Malotte [DISSENT] by Carter, Jesse W.
Golden Gate University School of Law
GGU Law Digital Commons
Jesse Carter Opinions The Jesse Carter Collection
1-27-1956
People v. Malotte [DISSENT]
Jesse W. Carter
Supreme Court of California
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons
This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Jesse Carter Collection at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Jesse Carter Opinions by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carter, Jesse W., "People v. Malotte [DISSENT]" (1956). Jesse Carter Opinions. Paper 160.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions/160
PEoPLE v. 1\II:.A.LoTTE 
[46 C.2d 59; 292 P.2d 517] 
No. 5761. In Bank. Jan. 1956.] 
PEOPLE, Respondent, v. MABEL MA.LOTTE, 
Appellant. 
59 
Privacy-What Constitutes Violation of Right.-When a per-
son discusses the commission of a crime with another, face 
to face or at a distance through the ·use of any means of 
communication, there is no unreasonable invasion of privacy 
when the other uses the conversation against him. 
Telegraphs and Telephones-Crimes.-Where a conversation 
was recorded by police officers at the moment it reached the 
intended receiver, there was no interception within the mean-
of the Federal Communications Act, § 605, prohibiting 
any person not authorized by the sender to intercept any com-
munication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, 
substance, purport, effect or meaning of such intercepted 
communication to anyone. 
Id.-Crimes.-There is no learning of the contents of a com-
munication "fraudulently, clandestinely, or in any other un-
authorized manner" in violation of Pen. Code, § 640, pro-
hibiting tapping or an unauthorized connection with a 
telegraph or telephone line, when one participant to the con-
versation consents to or directs its overhearing or preserva-
tion. 
Criminal Law- Defenses- Entrapment.-Where an accused 
had a preexisting criminal intent, the fact that when solicited 
by a decoy he committed a crime raises no inference of un-
lawful entrapment. 
Id.-Instruetions-Defenses-Entrapment.-Where there is a 
complete absence of any evidence of unlawful entrapment, no 
instruction on the subject need be given. 
(1) Right of privacy, notes, 138 A.L.R. 22; 168 A.L.R. 446; 14 
A.L.R.2d 750. See also Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp, (1949 Rev.), Privacy, 
§ 2; Am.Jur., Privacy, § 20 et seq. 
[2] See Cal.Jur., Telegraphs and Telephones, § 33 et seq.; Am. 
Telegraphs and Telephones, § 65. 
Entrapment to commit crime with view to punishment there-
for, notes, 18 A.L.R. 146; 66 A.L.R. 478; 86 A.L.R. 263. See also 
Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 200 et seq.; Am.Jur., Criminal Law, 
§304. 
McK. Dig. References: [1J Privacy, § 2; [2, 3] Telegraphs and 
Telephones, §4; [4] Criminal Law, §50; [5] Criminal Law, §761; 
9] Conspiracy, § 5; [7] Conspiracy, § 3; [8] Criminal Lf'V, 
; [10} Municipal Corporations, § 237. 
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[6] Conspiracy-Criminal- Particular Conspiracies.-Defendant 
was not improperly charged with a conspiracy to violate a 
municipal police code section prohibiting an offer or agree-
ment to commit an act of prostitution on the ground that she 
could only be charged with a conspiracy to violate another 
municipal police code section prohibiting one from soliciting 
any person for the purpose of prostitution, since the two code 
sections set forth separate offenses, the first making the offer 
or agreement one's own, while the other relates to solicitation 
for another. 
[7] !d.-Criminal-Overt Act.-A conspirator does not have to 
participate in the crime conspired. 
[8] Criminal Law-Principals-Aiders and Abetters.-Conspiracy 
is not synonymous with aiding or abetting or participating; 
it implies an agreement to commit a crime, while to aid and 
abet requires actual participation in the act constituting the 
offense. 
[9] Conspiracy-Criminal- Particular Conspiracies.-Pen. Code, 
§ 182, occupies the field of conspiracy and prohibits a con-
spiracy "to commit any crime," and in prescribing the punish-
ment for conspiracies to commit misdemeanors, no distinction 
is drawn between misdemeanors defined by city ordinances 
and those defined by statute. 
[10] Municipal Corporations- Ordinances- Conflict With Stat-
utes.-Although the Legislature can make exceptions to the 
statutes enacted by it, inferior legislative bodies cannot. 
( Const., art. XI, § 11.) 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the 
City and County of San Francisco and from an order deny-
ing a new trial. John B. Molinari, Judge. Affirmed. 
Prosecution for conspiring to commit a misdemeanor and 
for contributing to the delinquency of a minor. Judgment 
of conviction affirmed. 
Leslie C. Gillen and John R. Golden for Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn, 
Chief Assistant Attorney General, and Raymond 1\1. 1\1om-
boisse, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Mabel lVIalotte appeals from a judgment 
of conviction entered on a jury verdict finding her guilty of 
conspiring to commit a misdemeanor (Pen. Code, § 182), 
and of contributing to the delinquency of a minor (Welf. 
& Inst. Code, § 702.) She also appeals from the order deny-
ing her motion for a new trial. 
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On March 10, 1954, Frank Lombardi, at the request of 
police, made a telephone call from the district attorney's 
office in San Francisco. He identified himself and said, 
listen Mabel; a friend of mine will be in town tonight, 
he will call you. His name is Leonard ·windsor. Can 
vou take care of him?'' 'I' his telephone call was not recorded 
· the officers present were unable to hear the party at the 
other end of the line. 
At about 8 o'clock that night Inspectors 0 'Haire and 
:McGuire of the San Francisco Police Department went to 
room 712 at the Sir I1~rancis Drake Hotel, where they had 
previously registered. They placed a recording apparatus 
under one of the beds and connected it to an induction coil, 
a (1evice designed to overhear a telephone conversation with-
ont the necessity of making physical connection with the tele-
phone electrical circuit. Inspector 0 'Haire then placed a call 
to Prospect 6-3267, and defendant answered. Their conver-
sation was as follows: 
''Hello. 
''Is this Mrs. Malotte? 
"Yes. 
'' Uh-this is-uh-Ijeonard Windsor. 
"Yes. 
"Uh-Mr. Frank Lombardi told me to get in touch with 
you this evening. 
''Yes; he told me. 
"He did? 
"Yes. 
"Well, I'm staying up at-uh-Sir Francis Drake, room 
712. 
''All right 
"And-uh-I have my friend, Mr. Bacci. 
"Uh-no, he didn't. But I'll-I'll take care of it. What's 
the name, did you say? 
''Bacci. 
"All right. I'll-uh-what time do you want them, right 
now? 
"Well, not right at the moment. In about an hour, half 
an hour, an hour. 
"That'll be fine. All right, I'll take care of it. 
''Yes, what time shall we expect them, in half an hour, an 
hour? 
''In about an hour will be fine. 
''An hour? 
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"Yes. 
''All right. 
"Okay. 
''All right. 
"Bye." 
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About an hour after the telephone call Yola Boles, a 
minor, came to the hotel room and introduced herself as 
Adele. The second girl failed to appear, and Yola gave the 
officers another telephone number, which they called to ask 
about the delay. Defendant also answered this call and told 
them that the other girl would be along in a few minutes. 
In the meantime, Mary Madsen, the other girl, thinking 
she saw a plainclothesman following her, called defendant 
for instructions. Defendant called the hotel room and asked 
to speak to ''Adele,'' but was told that she was occupied. 
Mary again called defendant, as she had been instructed 
to do on her previous call, and was told that there was 
nothing wrong and to go on up. Mary, however, refused to 
enter the hotel unescorted. Defendant told her to call the 
room and have the customer come down to meet her. Mary 
called the room, asked 0 'Haire to come down, and asked him 
to call defendant. 0 'Haire made the call and was told by 
defendant, "Well, I have the girl on the other phone now 
and she will meet you across the street in the Owl Drug 
Store." None of these subsequent calls were recorded, nor 
were they overheard by anyone except the parties thereto. 
Inspector 0 'Haire met Mary at the Owl Drug Store and 
returned with her to the room. The girls were paid $25 
each. They disrobed and got into the beds. The officers 
took badges from their luggage, identified themselves as of-
ficers, and placed the girls under arrest. Then they went to 
defendant's apartment and waited outside overnight until 
a warrant could be secured for her arrest. When they secured 
the warrant, they demanded admittance, explained their 
purpose, and forced the door when she refused to answer. 
(See Pen. Code, § 844.) They found her hiding in the attic. 
Defendant contends that the evidence of the recorded phone 
call was inadmissible on the ground that it >vas obtained in 
violation of her constitutional rights and in violation of 
federal and California statutes. She maintains that with-
out the interpretation the recorded call gives to the suh-
sequent transactions no conspiracy is established, leaving in-
admissible the extrajudicial acts and declarations of the girls, 
alleged coconspirators, and uncorroborated Mary's testimony, 
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her with defendant to serve as a 
her. 
general, relying on Olmstead v. United States, 
438 [48 S.Ct. 564, 72 L.Ed. 944, 66 .A.L.R. 376], and 
v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 [62 S.Ct. 993, 86 
, contends that the overhearing of the telephone 
by means of the induction coil was not a search 
seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment 
Constitution of the United States and article I, section 
the California Constitution. It is unnecessary to de-
whether those cases have been unsettled by Irvine 
California, 347 U.S. 128 [74 S.Ct. 381, 98 L.Ed. 561], for 
is a basic difference between the conduct of the officers 
in that case and the conduct of Inspectors 0 'Haire and 
herein. In the Irvine case there were several tres-
passes when the microphone was installed and subsequently 
moved in the Irvine home, and an "incredible" invasion of 
the to privacy through the eavesdropping over the 
microphone. The officers monitored indiscriminately not only 
the conversat1ons pertaining to gambling, but those involving 
phase of the Irvine's personal affairs. The technique 
used by the officers made selectivity impossible. In the pres-
ent case there was neither trespass nor indiscriminate eaves-
Unlike the Irvine case, nothing was overheard 
but the free discussion of a crime by one who thought her 
listener a client. [1] When a person discusses the com-
mission of a crime with another, face to face or at a distance 
through the use of any means of communication, there is no 
unreasonable invasion of privacy when the other uses the 
conversation against him. 
Defendant contends, however, that the evidence was ob-
tained in violation of the Federal Communications Act ( 47 
U.S.C.A. § 605), and section 640 of the California Penal Code 
and that it was, therefore, inadmissible under the rule of 
v. Cahan, 44 Cal.2d 434 [282 P.2d 905]. 
Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act provides: 
". . . no person not being authorized by the sender shall 
intercept any comm1mication and divulge or publish the 
existence, contents, substance, purport, effect or meaning 
of such intercepted communication to any person; ... " A 
majority of the federal courts define "intercept" as used in 
section 605 to mean ''to take or seize by the way, or before 
arrival at the destined place," and hold that there is no inter-
when the intended receiver consents to or directs the 
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the cmnmunication at the moment it reaches 
States v. Y ce Ping J ong, 26 F.Supp. 69, 70; 
United States v. Lewis, 87 P.Supp, 970, 973, reversed on 
other grounds st~b nom. Billeci v. United States, 184 F.2d 394; 
United States v. Sullivan, 116 F.Supp. 480, 482; United States 
v. Pierce, 124 P.Supp. 264, 267; and see dissent of Clark, J. to 
Unit eel States v. Polakoff, 112 F.2d 888, 891; cf. United 
States v. Polakoff, supra, 112 F.2d 888, 889; United States v. 
Stephenson, 121 F.Supp. 274, 277.) The United States Su-
preme Court, approving this definition in the Goldman case, 
supm, 316 U. S. 129, 134, went on to say: "[Intercept] does 
not ordinarily connote the obtaining of what is to be sent 
before, or at the moment, it leaves the possession of the pro-
posed sender, or after, or at the moment, it comes into the 
possession of the intended receiver." (See Reitmeister v. 
Reitrneister, 162 F.2d 691.) [2] Thus, as in the present 
case, where the conversation was recorded by the officers ''at 
the moment" it reached the "intended receiver," there was 
no interception within the meaning of section 605 of the 
Federal Communications .Act. [3] There was likewise no 
invasion of privacy in violation of section 640 of the Penal 
Code. 1 There is no learning of the contents of a communica-
tion "fraudulently, clandestinely, or in any other unauthor-
ized manner'' when one of the participants to the conversation 
consents to or directs its overhearing or preservation. (See 
People v. Channel, 107 Cal..App.2d 192, 200 [236 P.2d 654].) 
Defendant complains that the trial court erred in refusing 
to instruct the jury on the defense of entrapment. .A sub-
stantial part of the conversation between Frank Lombardi 
and defendant, and all of that between Inspector 0 'Haire 
and defendant is quoted above. Neither conversation, nor 
any testimony brought out at the trial by defendant or the 
People shows more than the creation of an opportunity for 
defendant to act on her preexisting criminal intent. 
[4] "Where an accused has a preexisting criminal intent, 
1
" Every person who, by means of any machine, instrument, or con-
trivance, or in any other manner, willfully and fraudulently, or clan-
destinely taps, or makes any unauthorized connection with any telegraph 
or telephone wire, line, cable, or instrument under the control of any 
telegraph or telephone company; or who willfully and fraudulently, or 
clandestinely, or in any other unauthorized manner, reads, or attempts 
to read, or to learn the contents or meaning of any message, report, or 
communication while the same is in transit or passing over any tele-
graph or telephone wire, line, or cable, or is being sent from, or 
received at any place within this State ... , is punishable [by fine and 
imprisonment.]'' 
J 
PEOPLE v. MA.LOTTE 
[46 C.2d 59; 292 P.2d 517] 
65 
that vvhen solicited a he committed a crime 
no inference of unlawful '' (People v. 
109 Cal.App.2d 450, 455 [240 P.2d 1024], quoted 
with approval in People v. B1·addock, 41 Cal.2d 794, 802 [264 
P.2d .) [5] 'rhus, as in this case, where there is a 
absence of any evidence of unlawful entrapment, no 
on the subject need be given. (People v. Alamillo, 
11::1 Cal.App.2d 617, 621 [248 P.2d 421]; People v. Jackson, 
106 Cal.App.2d 114, 125 [234 P.2d 766] ; People v. Harris, 
80 Cal.App. 328,331 [251 P. 823].) 
[6] Defendant also contends that even if we admit the 
to which she objects, the judgment must be reversed 
on the ground that she was improperly charged with a con-
spiracy to violate section 240, subdivision (a), of the Police 
Code of San Francisco. She claims that section 2252 of the 
Police Code defines the same offense as does section 240,3 and 
argues that since section 225 provides a lesser penalty, she 
can be charged with a conspiracy to violate that section. 
The two sections set forth separate offenses. One can solicit 
for another ( § 225), but the offer or agreement to commit an 
act of prostitution is one's own.(§ 240, subd. (a).) [7] De-
fendant contends that if the sections are not the same, and 
if section 240, subdivision (a), is construed as referring to an 
act of prostitution to be committed by the one making the 
offer or agreement, the evidence shows only a conspiracy to 
violate section 225 and not section 240, subdivision (a), since 
she did not offer or agree to commit an act of prostitution. 
The answer to this contention is that a conspirator does not 
haYe to participate in the crime conspired. 
Finally, defendant contends that the felony charge was 
improper and that she should have been sentenced and con-
victed for a misdemeanor only, on the ground that subsection 
(g) of section 240 of the Police Code, which makes it a mis-
demeanor to aid or abet or participate in the doing of any of 
the acts prohibited by section 240, should be construed as 
prohibiting a conspiracy to violate section 240. [8] Con-
spiracy, however, is not synonymous with aiding or abetting 
or participating. Conspiracy implies an agreement to commit 
a crime; to aid and abet requires actual participation in the 
2
" It shall be unlawful for any person on any public street or highway 
or elsewhere, to solicit, by word, act, gesture, knock, sign or other· 
wise, any person for the purpose of prostitution.'' 
""Every person is guilty of a misdemeanor who: (a) Offers or agrees 
, to commit any lewd or indecent act or any act of prostitution; '' l we~ 
G6 PEOPLE v. :MALOTTE [46 C.2d 
aet the offense v. Bond, 13 Cal.App. 
175 [109 P. 150].) [9] Moreover, section 182 of the Penal 
Code occupies the field of conspiracy and a conspir-
acy ''to commit any crime.'' In prescribing the punishment 
for conspiracies to commit misdemeanors, no distinction is 
drawn between misdemeanors defined by city ordinance and 
those defined by statute. The case of In re Williamson, 43 
Cal.2d 651 [276 P.2d 593], holding section 7030 of the Busi-
ness and Professions Code, dealing with conspiracies to 
violate certain licensing provisions of that code, to be an 
exception to the general conspiracy provisions of section 182 
of the Penal Code, is not in point, for section 240, subdivision 
(g), of the Police Code of San Francisco cannot be considered 
such an exception. [10] Although the Legislature can make 
exceptions to the statutes enacted by it, inferior legislative 
bodies cannot. (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 11; Pipoly v. Benson, 
20 Cal.2d 366, 370 l125 P.2d 482, 147 A.L.R. 515], and cases 
cited therein.) Thus, defendant was properly charged with 
and convicted of a felony. 
The judgment and order are affirmed. 
Shenk, J., Spence, J., and :McComb, J., concurred. 
CAR'rER, J.-I dissent. 
I am of the opinion that the judgment should be reversed 
for failure to instruct the jury on the defense of entrapment. 
There is evidence in the record which would support a verdict 
based on that defense. The police officers induced Frank 
Lombardi, a friend of defendant, to solicit her to commit the 
criminal act here involved. 
The police officer involved in the entrapment testified: 
'' Q. You, either alone or with the assistance of someone 
else conceived the idea of setting into motion a set of circum-
stances to cause someone to commit a crime, isn't that 
correct ~ . . . A. Yes.'' 
After the solicitation by Lombardi the police officers posed 
as decoys and made further solicitation of defendant which 
culminated in the consummation of the crime. The jury could 
have concluded that the police originated and set in motion a 
scheme to cause defendant to commit a crime. This could be 
interpreted to mean that regardless of the innocent or guilty 
frame of mind of the victim, the police sought to cause her to 
commit a crime. This purpose was carried out, the first step 
being a telephone call by Lombardi to defendant asking her 
to violate the law. In Cline v. Un,ited States, 20 F.2d 494, 
PEOPLE v. MALOTTE 
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a narcotic for a dope addict upon the 
of the latter whom he knew and who ·was acting 
in fear of the police in making the solicitation. The court 
held there was entrapment as a matter of law. ln Un£ted 
Eman illfg. Co., 271 F. 353, the governmeut agent, 
to be a customer for defendant's medicinal prod~ 
'' wrote to defendant asking it to send him 
some. Defendant did so but misbranded the Sulfox which 
a violation of the food and drug laws when the 
1vas placed in interstate commerce. The court held 
there was entrapment. In People v. Gallagher, 107 Cal.App. 
425 [290 P. 504], the officers had Dall, an addict and seller 
solicit defendant, an addict, to buy drugs. The 
was left on the street, and, at Dall's request, defendant 
for it and picked it up whereupon he was arreBted for 
possession. The judgment of conviction was rPversed 
for failure to instruct on entrapment, the court stating 
429) : "It must be borne in mind that appellant was not 
with having sold or bargained to sell any drugs ; nor 
was any evidence whatever introduced to show that such was 
his intention. The present case, therefore, is quite different 
from those upon which respondent seems to rely, showing that 
a defendant ·was already in the illeg·al possession of an article, 
hut was entrapped into selling it. In the case at bar the 
of appellant's defense was that the possession by him 
of ~;aid drug was bronght about solely throngh the instru-
mentalities of the state's agent and those working under him, 
for the very purpose of eausing his arrest. As said in the 
case of In re illoore, 70 Cal.App. 483 [233 P. 805, 806], 'It 
may be conceded that it would be violative of sound public 
and repngnant to good morals to uphold the conviction 
of person who, being entirely innocent of any intention to 
commit a crime, was inveigled into its commission by an 
officer of the law or by a private detective hired for that 
purpose by some self-constitnted guardian of the public 
morals. (People v. Barkdoll, 36 Cal.App. 25 [171 P. 440].)'" 
views on entrapment were expressed in my dissent in 
v. Bmddock, 41 Cal.2d 794, 803 [264 P.2d 521]. 
For the foregoing reason I would reverse the judgment. 
J., concnrred. 
ppellant ':,; JH~titiou for a reheariug was denied Ii'ebruary 
21, 1956. Carter, J., and Schauer, ,J., were of the opinion 
that the petition should be granted. 
